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Modeling cross-sectional heterogeneity in the growth process is a
central issue in economic growth empirics. This paper employs a
novel modeling strategy – the smooth coefﬁcient quantile regression
(SCQR) model – to examine the role of social capital in generating
heterogeneities in the growth process across 3,059 U.S. counties
This modeling strategy allows us to model the parameters in growth
equations as unspeciﬁed quantile-speciﬁc smooth functions of the
level of social capital and therefore uncovering the hidden structure
at various quantiles of the growth distribution.
Ever since Putnam's (1993) inﬂuential work which shows that so-
cial capital, deﬁned as trust, interpersonal networks, and cooperative
norms, is conductive to economic progress, the economic growth lit-
erature has witnessed a surge of empirical research on the link be-
tween social capital and growth, most of them examine the direct
effect of social capital on growth under a parametric conditionalmean regression framework.1 While economic theories have pre-
dicted that social capital not only affects growth directly, but also
plays a critical role in inﬂuencing the environment in which the econ-
omy grows, which in turn determines the marginal effects of human
capital, government activity, population density, income inequality,
and ethnic diversity on economic activities, there has been little evi-
dence on how social capital contributes to heterogeneity in the
growth process.2 In short, the bulk of the extant empirical studies
on the social capital–growth nexus adopt a pre-speciﬁed parametric
mean regression framework and disregard the consequences of im-
posing linearity and parameter homogeneity and focusing exclusively
on the central location of the growth distribution on model interpret-
ability. Assuming linearity and parameter homogeneity may mask
complex interactions among the covariates and thereby leading to
possible misspeciﬁcation bias. For instance, constraining the growthck and Keefer (1997), Whiteley (2000), Zak and Knack (2001),
elsdijk et al. (2004), and Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2005). For
ares evidence on the transmission channels from social capital
skov (2010).
Zak and Knack (2001), which ﬁnds that the interaction term be-
and initial GDP to be signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that more
iated with faster convergence.
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crease monotonically with the level of social capital at a constant
rate is unrealistic. It would be more sensible to treat the growth effect
of ethnic diversity as a smooth function of the level of social capital.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the heterogeneity
of the growth process, which usually involves sorting countries into
groups, each having its own distinct growth regime. Using smooth
coefﬁcient mean regressions, Durlauf et al. (2001) demonstrate that
explicitly accounting for parameter heterogeneity substantially en-
hances the ﬁt of cross-country growth regression models. Durlauf
and Johnson (1995), Canova (2004), Paap et al. (2005), Alfo et al.
(2008), Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009), and Owen et al. (2009)
respectively use the regression tree analysis, predictive density approach,
data-based latent-class panel time seriesmodel, non-parametric random
coefﬁcient model, threshold regression (Hansen (2000)), and ﬁnite-
mixture model to group countries and estimate group-speciﬁc growth
regimes. However, these studies ignore social capital completely and re-
strict countries in the same group to obey identical growth process.
Another limitation of the extant literature on the social capital–
growth nexus is its exclusive focus on the conditional mean of growth.
Whilemean regressions quantify behaviors at the central location of the
growth distribution, they provide little information about behaviors at
noncentral locations. If the upper or lower quantiles are of interest,
then policy implications derived from mean regressions could be
misleading.3 As a concrete example, if the aim is to study the association
between social capital and economic growth in slow- (or fast-) growing
economies then it is more sensible to model the lower (or higher) per-
centiles of growth, rather than the conditional mean growth, as the re-
sponse variable. A way to cope with such problems is to adopt the
quantile regressionmodel, which extends the classical mean regression
model to a range of models by estimating various conditional quantile
functions. It enables one to obtain a more complete picture of how co-
variate effects differ across the percentiles of the response variable.4
This paper extends the smooth coefﬁcient analysis in Durlauf et al.
(2001) by ﬁtting a SCQRmodel for each of the quantiles of the growth
distribution of interest. Speciﬁcally, we estimate an empirical growth
model in which the quantile-speciﬁc intercept and marginal effects of
initial income, human capital, inequality, ethnic diversity, population
density, and government activity on the quantile of the growth distri-
bution of interest are smooth functions of a measure of social capital.
The proﬁle shapes of the smooth intercept function and the coefﬁ-
cient functions over the level of social capital will respectively show
how a quantile of the growth distribution varies with the level of so-
cial capital after conditioning on the covariates and how marginal ef-
fects of the covariates are constrained by the level of social capital.
Since the SCQR model nests parametric quantile regression models,
it tends to ﬁt the data better than the latter model.
Despite the vast literature on growth empirics, there appears to be
little conﬁdence in the results, primarily due to the implausible as-
sumption of parameter homogeneity and the exclusive focus on con-
ditional mean.5 This paper makes four major contributions to the
empirical literature on the heterogeneity in cross-sectional growth
process. First, it is the ﬁrst paper to examine the sources of heteroge-
neous growth by exploring the role of social capital as a conditioning
variable that inﬂuences the impacts of conventional determinants of
growth.6 Second, in the SCQR framework, economies similar in3 For parametric constant-coefﬁcient quantile regression analyses of economic
growth, see Barreto and Hughes (2004), Foster (2008), and Ram (2008). These studies,
however, do not include social capital as a regressor in their growth equations.
4 See Koenker (2005) and Hao and Naiman (2007) for excellent introductions and
interesting applications of quantile regression.
5 For reasons why linear growth models are uncompelling and for evidence of pa-
rameter heterogeneity across regions, see Durlauf et al. (2001), Brock and Durlauf
(2001), and Durlauf et al. (2008).
6 By contrast, the extant literature focuses on parameter heterogeneity associated
with regions, initial income, and institutional quality.terms of the position on the conditional growth distribution and
levels of social capital have similar but not exactly identical growth
processes.7 Third, this paper complements the existing literature to
explore heterogeneity in covariate effects across levels of social capi-
tal as well as quantiles of the growth distribution. Fourth, our meth-
odology provides evidence on not only the state variable role, but
also the direct information variable role of social capital in the growth
process.8 Unlike linear growth models, where cross-sectional growth
differentials are attributed solely to differences in covariate values,
the SCQR model attributes cross-sectional differences in economic
performance to discrepancies across economies in the value of covari-
ates as well as its marginal effects.
2. Why does social capital matter to economic growth?
This section ﬁrst surveys the direct effect of social capital on
growth and then outlines the theoretic underpinnings for modeling
the relationships between human capital, inequality, diversity, gov-
ernment activity and economic growth as functions of a county's
level of social capital.
2.1. The direct role of social capital in growth
Social capital is a multidimensional concept. Over the last few de-
cades, scholars from several different disciplines have proposed vari-
ous deﬁnitions for the concept of social capital. From a psychological
perspective, Granovetter (1985) points out that people base their
economic decisions on past interactions with people and prefer to
transact with those who have a good reputation. Hence, economic
transactions are embedded within social relationships. Coleman
(1988) ﬁrst terms social capital as “the aspects of social structure
that facilitate coordination and cooperation among agents within
the structure.” In his inﬂuential book which popularized the concept
of social capital, Putnam (1993) deﬁnes social capital as “features of
social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can im-
prove the efﬁciency of a society by facilitating coordinated actions.”
Bowles and Gintis (2002) further refer social capital to “trust, con-
cerns for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one's
community and to punish those who do not.” Sabatini (2009) distin-
guishes and builds indicators for ﬁve dimensions of social capital:
strong family ties, weak informal ties, voluntary organizations, active
political participation, and civic awareness. Although a consensus on
the deﬁnition and measurement of social capital is yet to be reached,
the World Bank (2010) offers a broad deﬁnition of the notion: “Social
capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective ac-
tion”. It encompasses institutions, relationships, and customs that
shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions.”
The theoretic literature yields contrasting predictions regarding
the effect of social capital on growth. Granovetter (1973) argues
that weak interpersonal ties facilitate information diffusion, while
Olson (1982) posits that horizontal associations tend to represent
the interest of a small group of people, leading to inefﬁcient economic
policies. Conversely, Putnam (1993) maintains that civic engagement
promotes the formation of trust, and thereby improving the quality of
governance and thus economic performance. Zak and Knack (2001)
propose a model with a moral hazard problem and demonstrate
that as more resources are allocated to inspection and monitoring,7 In prior studies that assign countries to growth regimes using threshold regression
models or regression tree analysis, economies with a similar level of development are
restricted to obey identical growth process. Finite mixture models classify countries in-
to growth regimes according to the combination of class membership predictors, but
countries of the same group are still required to operate under identical production
regime.
8 In studies based on ﬁnite mixture models, the class membership predictors play
the role of state variables that affect the environment in which economic activities take
place without inﬂuencing growth directly.
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investment. Routledge and Amsberg (2003) outline a trading game
where gains from trade are a prisoners’ dilemma and social struc-
ture is a by-product of individuals’ rational choice. In their model,
social structure determines the frequency of trade, which in turn
inﬂuences agents’ decisions on whether to trade cooperatively.
Routledge and Amsberg show that welfare can decrease, increase,
or be Pareto-noncomparable after a reduction in social capital.
Guiso et al. (2004) demonstrate that higher social trust contributes
to higher ﬁnancial development. Akçomak and ter Weel (2009) pre-
sent that when social capital is higher, venture capitalists are more
willing to invest in innovation.
2.2. The interaction between social capital and human capital
It is well established that human capital is an important determi-
nant of economic performance.9 Recently, several theoretic analyses
postulate that the productivity of human capital is higher in societies
having a higher stock of social capital. Burt (1992) analyzes the rela-
tionship between strategic positions in networks and compensation
and conﬁrms that members in social networks are paid higher.
More importantly, Burt ﬁnds that due to network externality, some
returns from network participation are captured by people who
transact with those who invest in social ties, indicating that network
externalities may improve the productivity of the economy's aggre-
gate stock of human capital. Dasgupta (2009) further articulates on
network externalities in a simple model and concludes that if net-
work externalities are economy-wide, like public goods, then an in-
crease in trust among members of a group of people will manifest
itself in total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Knack and Keefer
(1997) argue that civic involvements may increase the productivity
of human capital for two reasons. First, trust and civic involvement
improve the quality of governance, which in turn raises the quality
of public-provided education. Second, trust is linked to stronger con-
tract enforcement, which triggers investments in innovation that lead
to a higher return to higher education. Papagapitos and Riley (2009)
argue that higher trust leads to higher stocks of physical capital,
which increases the productivity of human capital. In brief, the afore-
mentioned theories imply that social capital may serve as a condition-
ing information variable that indicates the quality and productivity of
human capital.
2.3. The interaction between social capital and government activity
It has been widely documented that the quality of governance is a
key factor behind economic growth.10 Researchers have even argued
that social capital may foster public–private cooperation and help
hold accountable the elected representatives. The theoretic literature
proposes at least two mechanisms whereby social capital is linked to
the quality of governance: the bureaucratic and electoral effects. As
for the bureaucratic effect, Arrow (1972) emphasizes that trust and
social cohesion leads to an increase in the supply of trustworthy bu-
reaucrats and politicians who make better decisions and implement
these decisions effectively. Alternatively, the literature on the elector-
al effect suggests that politicians are more responsive to voters’ de-
mand when citizens are more civically minded. Boix and Posner
(1998) and Putnam (2000) claim that social capital makes citizens
more sophisticated consumers of politics, who are better able to mon-
itor the government and hold elected politicians accountable for9 For empirical evidence on the relationship between human capital and growth, see
Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), and Temple (2001).
10 To name a few, Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006).formulating and implementing better policies. Putnam (1993, 2000)
demonstrates that in more civic regions, politicians are more likely
to compromise and agree with their political opponents. Putnam
(1993) also shows that in societies where people are less public-
spirited, politics are more likely to be divisive and polarized, render-
ing innovation and ﬂexibility in policies more difﬁcult.
In sharp contrast, Olson (1982) argues that members of a group
may use their connections to lobby for preferential policies such as
quotas and restrictions to entry, leading to sclerosis and inefﬁcient
policies. Bjørnskov (2010) formally models both the bureaucratic
and electoral transmission channels of social capital to the quality of
governance. Consistent with the electoral mechanism, Bjørnskov
(2010) ﬁnds evidence that the effect of trust on governance quality
is stronger in countries having a higher degree of political competi-
tion. Ahlerup et al. (2009) present a principal–agent investment
model and show that social capital has a larger positive effect on eco-
nomic performance at lower levels of institutional development.
However, when institutional strength is sufﬁciently strong, social
capital becomes less growth-enhancing.
Assuming that the underlying culture is a primitive, Carlin et al.
(2009) conclude that in societies without (with) complete state con-
tingent contracts and punishment schemes for opportunistic behav-
ior and/or where individuals interact infrequently (frequently),
government regulations and trust are substitutes (complements). In
this instance, an increase in government regulation results in less
(more) aggregate investment and thus decreased (increased) growth.
In sum, theories and empirical evidence have established that inter-
personal trust yields better governmental performance, which accel-
erates the process of economic development. From a policy
perspective, the next relevant step is to ﬁgure out the level of social
capital at which the growth effect of government activity is the
highest.2.4. The interaction between social capital and ethnic diversity
The theoretic research on how social polarization shapes econom-
ic performance has generated mutually contrasting implications. On
the one hand, ethnic diversity may impose costs on economic perfor-
mance because ethnically diverse communities present more difﬁcul-
ties in agreeing on the management and provision of public goods. On
the other hand, diversity in ability and culture may spark creativity
and innovation.11
Ethnic diversity operates through a variety of channels to damp-
en economic growth. Keefer and Knack (2002) argue that in polar-
ized societies, government policies protecting property and
contractual rights are prone to be unstable, diverting investments
toward less risky projects and therefore inhibiting economic
growth. Under the assumption that the level of trust is lower in
heterogeneous societies, Zak and Knack (2001) propose that agents
in more heterogeneous societies spend more resources investigat-
ing each other and are more risk-averse, thereby reducing invest-
ment and economic growth.12 In short, diversity reduces the
provision of public, worsens the quality of public policies, and
draws resources from productive uses towards inspecting and
monitoring other ethnic groups. Naturally, the next step inquires
into whether a higher stock of social capital can enhance growth11 Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Florida (2002a, 2002b) ﬁnd evidence that diversity
has positive amenity effects on rent and wage.
12 Platteau (1994) provides evidence that heterogeneity in religion and language in-
hibits trade in West Africa. Knack and Keefer (1997) maintain and provide evidence
that social polarization can encourage rent-seeking behavior. Alesina et al. (1999) pre-
sent evidence showing that agreements regarding school locations are harder to reach
in ethnically divided cities.
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groups.132.5. The interaction between social capital and income inequality
The extant literature postulates that income inequality affects
growth primarily through redistributive policies. Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) formulate an endogenous growth model with redistributive
conﬂicts among agents and show that inequality leads the median
voter to prefer higher taxes. Hence, inequality is harmful for growth
because it lowers the economy's investment rate. In a general equi-
librium model, Persson and Tabellini (1994) demonstrate that in-
equality leads to policies that do not protect property rights and
do not permit the full private appropriation of the return on invest-
ment. Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that inequality triggers socio-
economic instability, which depresses investments and economic
growth. However, in an endogenous growth model where redistri-
bution is in the form of public education, Saint-Paul and Verdier
(1993) show that inequality leads to more public education and
thus higher economic growth. In another strand of literature that
stresses credit market frictions, Bhattacharya (1998) argues that
in the presence of credit market imperfections, bequests (while ex-
acerbating inequality) alleviate ﬁnancial constraints, thereby foster-
ing capital accumulation and economic growth. Notably, Grenier
and Wright (2006) argue that in more unequal societies, social net-
works are more likely to be bonding social capital that connect peo-
ple who are similar, rather than bridging ties that links people from
more heterogeneous groups. The nature and consequences of social
networks may change with the extent of inequality in the commu-
nity. Since associations can play a role in redistributive policies
and thereby inﬂuence the amount of resources channeled towards
the poor, it is of interest to examine when and how social capital
improves the growth effect of inequality.14
While the aforementioned theoretic works have pointed out that
social capital may affect growth through altering the marginal effects
of human capital, inequality, government activity, and ethnic diversi-
ty on growth, this indirect conditioning information variable role of
social capital has been largely untested. Although it seems to be im-
plausible that the effect from a change in, e.g., the level of ethnic di-
versity index on growth in a community with a higher stock of
social capital is the same as that for a community with a lower
stock of social capital, most studies in the empirical social capital lit-
erature still assume that the parameters of the growth regression
are invariant across the level of social capital.15 In addition, no theo-
retic work has yet indicated that the social capital and growth deter-
minants interact in the same way in fast- and slow-growing
economies. Because covariate effects for economies with little social
capital may not be readily translated to those with a higher stock of
social capital, and factors identiﬁed to explain substantial portions
of economic growth in fast-growing economies may not hold the
same explanatory powers in slow-growing ones, from the policy per-
spective it is critical to explicitly account for the potential complex
and quantile-dependent interaction between social capital and
growth determinants in cross-sectional growth regressions.13 Of course, it is also possible that social networks are like enclaves that exacerbate
the dampening effect of diversity on growth. In fact, Dasgupta (2009) argues that the
more dissimilar the transactors are, the greater the beneﬁts are from transaction, and
then enclave-like social networks retard growth.
14 See Fafchamps (2002, 2004) for evidence on the pros and cons of ethnic-based so-
cial networks in increasing access to trade credit.
15 Durlauf et al. (2001) estimate a Solow growth model in which the aggregate pro-
duction function and thus the parameters vary according to a country's initial income
and they ﬁnd substantial parameter heterogeneity along that dimension. However,
Durlauf et al. (2001) do not consider conditional quantities other than the conditional
mean.3. Method
The bulk of empirical growth literature is based on the following
linear regression model.
Yi ¼∑mj¼0Xjiβj þ εi; i ¼ 1;2;…;n; ð1Þ
where Xi=(X0i, X1i,…, Xmi) is an m+1 dimensional observation of
covariates with its ﬁrst component being 1, i.e., X0i=1, β=(β0, β1,
…, βm) is an (m+1)×1 vector of parameters, and εi is the random
error. The ordinary least squares (OLS) assume that the conditional
mean E(Yi|Xi)= ∑ j=0m Xjiβj and that the random error εi has condi-
tional mean E(εi|Xi)=0.
When a conditional percentile of Yi replaces the conditional mean
as the response variable in (1), the resultant model is called the para-
metric quantile regression model. Deﬁne the τth conditional quantile
as qτ(Y|X)≡ inf{y :FY|X(y)≥τ} and assume that qτ(Yi|Xi)=∑ j=0m Xjiβjτ.
The parametric quantile regression is deﬁned as
Yi ¼∑mj¼0Xjiβτj þ ετi ; i ¼ 1;2;…;n; ð2Þ
where the τth conditional quantile of the error term εiτ is assumed to
be zero, i.e. qτ(εiτ|Xi)=0 (see Koenker 2005). In this setting, βτ=(β0τ,
β1τ,…, βmτ ) is a m+1 dimensional vector of constant but τ-dependent
regression coefﬁcients, where β0τ is the intercept term and βjτ, j=1, 2,
…,m, can be interpreted as the marginal change in the τth condition-
al quantile of Yassociated with a unit change in the jth covariate.
Koenker (2005) stresses that compared with OLS, which focus on
the conditional mean of the dependent variable, quantile regressions,
by focusing locally on a particular point on the conditional distribu-
tion, attain a higher robustness and a more natural interpretability.
The parametric quantile regression given by Eq. (2) is estimated by
choosing βjτs to minimize the following loss function:
∑
n
i¼1
ρτ Yi−∑
m
j¼0
Xjiβ
τ
j
 !
; ð3Þ
where ρτ(z)=z[τ− I(z≤0)] is a V-shaped piecewise linear loss func-
tion known as the “check” function and I(⋅) is the indicator function.
The conventional way to allow covariate effects to vary according
to a state variable in a parametric regression is to include interactions
terms between the covariates and the state variable. However, para-
metric models with interaction terms are subject to misspeciﬁcation,
since they restrict the covariate effects to vary with the state variable
at a constant rate. For instance, if the effect of ethnic diversity on
growth changes nonlinearly with the extent of social connectedness
in the community, then a parametric quantile regression model
with interaction terms is misspeciﬁed.
To accommodate the possible complex interactions between so-
cial capital and the determinants of growth, we employ the following
semiparametric quantile smooth coefﬁcient model developed by
Honda (2004) and Cai and Xu (2009):
Yi ¼∑mj¼0Xjiβτj Uið Þ þ ετi ; i ¼ 1;2;…;n; ð4Þ
where Ui denotes the state variable of the ith observation (Xi, Yi), εi is a
random error with τth conditional quantile zero, and the smooth inter-
cept β0τ(⋅) and the smooth coefﬁcients β1τ(⋅),…, βmτ (⋅)are now unspeci-
ﬁed, but smooth functions of the state variable U. Model (4) implicitly
assumes that the conditional quantile qτ Yi Xi;Uij Þ ¼∑mj¼0Xjiβτj Uið Þ

.
As no economic theories explicitly indicate the functional form of
the coefﬁcient function βτ(⋅)s, to study when and how social capital
constraints the growth effects of independent variables, we consider
the case that U is a measure of social capital for the ith county. It is im-
portant to note that in estimating Eq. (4), we do not include the state
variable U (in this analysis, the social capital index) as an independent
18 For an excellent introduction to quantile regression, see Koenker (2005). See Chen
and Wang (2005) for computational issues of the minimization of the loss function in
Eq. (5). Readers interested in the kernel smoothingmethod are referred to Fan andGijbels
(1996), Wand and Jones (1995), and Simonoff (1996) for excellent introductions.
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dent variable is captured by the smooth intercept. An intercept term
that does not vary (linearly or nonlinearly) with U is an indication
that U is not a direct information variable of Y.
In this paper, we adopt the kernel smoothing method in Cai and
Xu (2009) to estimate the m+1 coefﬁcient functions. We assume
that each coefﬁcient function βjτ(⋅), j=0, 1, 2,…, m, has the second
derivative. Consequently, by Taylor's theorem, the coefﬁcient βjτ(⋅)
can be locally approximated by a linear function in a neighborhood
of the given grid point u0 as follows:
βτj Uið Þ≈βτj u0ð Þ þ βτj 1ð Þ u0ð Þ Ui−u0ð Þ;
where βjτ(1)(u0)=(dβjτ(u)/du)| u=u0, i.e., the ﬁrst derivative of βj
τ(u0) at
u0. We estimate the coefﬁcients functions βjτ(u0)s by choosing ajτ and bjτ,
j=0,…,m, to minimize the locally weighted loss function given by:
1
h
∑
n
i¼1
ρτ Yi−∑
m
j¼0
Xjia
τ
j−∑
m
j¼0
Xjib
τ
j Ui−u0ð Þ
 !
 K Ui−u0
h
 
; ð5Þ
where K(⋅) is the kernel function introduced to assign weights to data-
points in a neighborhood of the grid point u0; h is the size of the neigh-
borhood known as bandwidth, which controls the smoothness of the
estimated coefﬁcient function.16 Solving the minimization problem in
(5) produces the local linear estimate ofβjτ(u0). In particular, by Taylor's
theorem, βˆ
τ
j u0ð Þ ¼ aˆτj is taken as the estimates of βjτ(u0). Moving u0
along the real line generates the entire curve of coefﬁcient estimate
βjτ(⋅). The rationale behind the above local linear estimator is straight-
forward. Simply put, the estimator βˆ
τ
j u0ð Þ is obtained by minimizing
the locally weighted loss function given by (5), using the observations
(Yi, 1, X1i,…, Xmi, Ui) whose Ui are close to u0.
This paper uses the kth-nearest neighbor (k-nn) rule and the leave-
one-out cross validation method (see Abberger, 1998 and Chen et al.,
forthcoming) to select the optimal bandwidth. As data on social capital
index are unevenly distributed in its support, and are particularly sparse
at the tails of the distribution, using kernel methods with a constant
bandwidth over the whole data range may lead to undersmoothing
(oversmoothing) where the data are clustered (sparse). To overcome
this problem, in estimating the βjτ(u0)s based on Eq. (5), we use varying
bandwidth by selecting a ﬁxed number of, say k, observations from
those{Yi, Xi, Ui}i=1n with Ui being one of the k nearest neighbors of u0.
According to the k-nn technique the bandwidth h used in Eq. (5) is
the kth smallest value of |Ui−u0|, i=1, 2,…, n.
To perform a statistical inference in the SCQR context, one can use
the t-statistics based on the standard errors derived from a consistent
estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix proposed by Cai and Xu
(2009). Speciﬁcally, Cai and Xu (2009) show that a consistent esti-
mate of the covariance matrix for the vector of coefﬁcient estimates
βˆ
τ
u0ð Þ can be explicitly expressed as:
Σˆ u0ð Þ ¼ Ωˆ
−1
1 u0ð ÞΩˆ0 u0ð ÞΩˆ
−1
1 u0ð Þ; ð6Þ
where Ωˆ1 ¼ 1nh ∑ni¼1wiXiX′ iK Ui−u0ð ÞandΩˆ0 ¼ 1nh ∑ni¼1XiX′iK Ui−u0ð Þ
with wi= I X
′
iβˆ
τ
j u0ð Þ−δnbYi≤X′iβˆ
τ
j u0ð Þ þ δn
 
= 2δnð Þ for any δn→0 as
n→∞.17 Consequently, the standard errors of βˆτ u0ð Þs are, respective-
ly, estimated by the square root of the diagonal elements of Σˆ u0ð Þ:
To compare the overall ﬁt of the parametric model and that of the
semiparametric SCQR model, we appeal the goodness of ﬁt measure
for quantile regression models introduced by Koenker and Machado16 Throughout this paper, we take K(z)=(15/16)(1−z2)2 for |z|≤1, and K(z)=0 for
|z|N1.
17 See Cai and Xu (2009) for details of the estimation of the covariance matrix by
Eq. (6) along with two alternative estimation methods for constructing a nonsingular
Ω^1:(1999). Koenker and Machado's measure is an analog of the R2 statis-
tic for least squares regression and is referred to as pseudo R2 in the
quantile regression literature.
The goodness of ﬁt measure for quantile regression is deﬁned as
R τð Þ ¼ 1−V1 τð Þ=V0 τð Þ ð7Þ
where V0 τð Þ ¼∑ni¼1ρτ Yi−Yˆ τ
 
; with Yˆ τ denoting the sample τth -
quantile of the response variable, and V1 τð Þ ¼∑ni¼1ρτ Yi−qˆτ

Yið jXi;UiÞÞwith qˆτ Yið jXi;UiÞbeing the model's ﬁtted value computed
from either the proposed SCQR model or its parametric counterpart.
For example, the ﬁtted value of SCQR model is given by
qˆτ Yi Xi;Uij Þ ¼∑mj¼0Xjiβˆ
τ
j
Uið Þ:

By deﬁnition, V1 is the weighted sum
of absolute distances between the observed Yi and the ﬁtted value
while V0 is the weighted sum of absolute distances between the ob-
served Yis and their sample quantile.
The measure R(τ) for a ﬁxed value of τ has the same interpreta-
tion as the classical R2 statistic for mean regression models, namely,
it ranges between 0 and 1 with a higher value indicating a better ﬁt
as a larger share of the sum of the total absolute distances V0(τ) is
explained by the ﬁtted SCQR model. See also Hao and Naiman
(2007) for a detailed discussion of the goodness of ﬁt measure togeth-
er with an excellent introduction of quantile regression.
The smooth coefﬁcient model for the conditional quantiles has
been developed only recently. To the best of our knowledge, no pre-
vious work has considered a smooth coefﬁcient model in a quantile
setting except Cai and Xu (2009), who use the method to explore
how the relationship between quantiles of house prices in the Boston
area and the number of rooms in a house varies with educational at-
tainment in the neighborhood. In addition, they also use the SCQR
strategy to uncover nonlinearities in the exchange rate of the Japa-
nese Yen against the U.S. dollar.18 There are, however, a number of
applications of the smooth coefﬁcient approach in a mean regression
setting— to name a few, Durlauf et al. (2001), Li et al. (2002), Stengos
and Zacharias (2006), and Lyssiotou et al. (2008).
4. Empirical model and data
The empirical question investigated in this paper is grounded in
the theories outlined in Section 2, which imply that the economy's
stock of social capital potentially alters the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and its determinants. For theτthconditional quantile of
the economic growth rate, we consider a regression model of the fol-
lowing form:
gyi ¼ βτ0 skið Þ þ βτ1 skið Þ ln y1990i þ βτ2 skið Þhci þ βτ3 skið Þdvi þ βτ4 skið Þiei
þβτ5 skið Þfgi þ βτ6 skið Þ lgi þ βτ7 skið Þldi þ εi
ð8Þ
Here, ln yi1990 is the real income per capita in 1990, the dependent
variable gyi ¼ 110 lny2000i − lny1990i
 
is the average annual growth rate
over the 10-year period 1990–2000, hci denotes the human capital in-
dicator, which is measured by the percent of adult population with a
bachelor's degree or higher, dvi is the ethnic diversity index, iei is the
Gini index, fgi is the percent of population employed in the federal
government, lgi is the percent of population employed in state and
local governments, ldi is land area per capita, and the state variable
ski is a measure of the level of social capital in county i.19 Although19 The speed of convergenceλ is related toβ1according to the following equation:
β1= (e−λT−1)/T. The conditional convergence hypothesis is supported if the estimate
on β1 is signiﬁcantly negative. Here, T is the number of periods used in the calculation
of the dependent variable, i.e. the average annual growth, and T equals 10 in this anal-
ysis. See page 58 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) for details on the formula for speed
of convergence.
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variable Description Mean S.D.
gy Average annual growth rate of real income per capita 0.0134 0.0105
sk Social capital index 0.0009 1.348
lny1990 Natural logarithm of per capita real income in 1990 4.7378 0.2146
hc Percent adult population with a bachelor's degree or
higher (%)
13.4006 6.4646
dv Ethnic diversity index 0.176 0.1681
ie Gini index 0.7392 0.0833
fg Percent population employed in the federal
government
0.0607 0.0459
lg Percent population employed in the state and local
governments
0.132 0.0486
ld Land area per capita in square miles 0.0965 0.2654
Note: The number of observations is 3059.
190 W.-S. Deng et al. / Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 185–197addressing causality in a cross-section can be problematic, the time
structure in this analysis provides some indication of a causal rela-
tion: the average annual economic growth rate over the period
1990–2000 is correlated with social capital and conventional growth
determinants measured in 1990.
Data on U.S. county-level indicators of social capital are drawn
from Rupasingha et al. (2006).20 The comprehensive county-level so-
cial capital index (sk) is created using principle component analysis
from data on the densities of civic, religious, and sports associations,
voter turnout for presidential elections, census response rate, and
the number of tax-exempt nonproﬁt organizations. As Rupasingha
et al. (2006) emphasize, the advantages of using county- or state-
level indicators of social capital over country-level ones are twofold.
First, measurement methods are more homogeneous within rather
than across countries, resolving data comparability issues. Second,
the main purpose of investment in social capital is to facilitate collec-
tive actions, and collective actions are more likely to take place at the
subnational level than at the national level.
The ethnic diversity index is constructed using the method pro-
posed by Alesina et al. (1999). Speciﬁcally, dvi ¼ 1−∑iri where ri is
the share of population self-reported as of race i∈(White, Black,
Asian, Hispanic, Paciﬁc Islander, American Indian, Other). This diver-
sity index measures the probability that two randomly selected peo-
ple are from different ethnic groups. As for the measure of income
inequality, since the Census Bureau does not provide the Gini index
at the county-level, we use the method proposed by Kelly (2000) to
construct an estimate of the county-level Gini index.21 Kelly's method
is based on a ratio of mean to median household income.22 Assume
that income follows a log–normal distribution, i.e., log(Y)∼N(μy,
σy2), and then mean income is equal to exp μy þ 12σ2y
 
, and median
income equals exp(μy). The log of the ratio of mean to median income
is 12σy, which can be used to calculate the Gini coefﬁcient following the
formula proposed by Shimizu and Crow (1988): ie ¼ 2Φ σyﬃﬃ
2
p
 
−1,
where Φ is the normal distribution. To alleviate the problem of endo-
geneity, the state variable and the independent variables are all mea-
sured in year 1990. Data used in the construction of the dependent
and independent variables are drawn from the USA Counties dataset
compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau.23 The analysis includes a total of
3,059 counties. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of key
variables.Table 2
OLS and parametric quantile regression results: baseline speciﬁcations.
OLS Parametric quantile regression
τ=0.05 τ=0.5 τ=0.95
sk −0.0006 0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0011
(2.48)** (0.70) (2.83)*** (2.87)***
lny1990 −0.0179 −0.0256 −0.0163 −0.0139
(8.27)*** (7.73)*** (14.05)*** (4.81)***
hc 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006
(9.35)*** (3.90)*** (11.54)*** (8.53)***
dv −0.0075 −0.0132 −0.0076 −0.0105
(5.43)*** (5.03)*** (5.91)*** (3.54)***
ie 0.0104 0.0096 0.0080 0.0027
(3.43)*** (1.80)* (3.44)*** (0.44)
fg −0.0008 −0.0010 −0.0007 −0.00115. Empirical results
5.1. OLS and parametric quantile regression results
As a preliminary analysis we estimate OLS and parametric quantile
regression models without and with interaction variables between
social capital and growth determinants. The inclusion of interaction
variables allows the coefﬁcients to vary with the level of social capital
at a constant rate.
Table 2 presents the OLS and parametric quantile estimates for the
speciﬁcation without interaction terms. Owing to space limitation, we
report only the results for the 0.05th, 0.5th, and 0.95th quantiles. In
general, the OLS coefﬁcient estimates have the same sign as their
quantile counterparts. Results of both estimation methods conﬁrm
conditional convergence across U.S. counties. Moreover, the two20 The U.S. county-level data on social capital 1990–2005 are compiled by Anil
Ruphasinga and Stephan J. Goetz. The data are available from the website of the North-
east Regional Center for Rural Development, Penn State University, University Park at
http://nercrd.psu.edu/Social_Capital/index.html.
21 Kelly's method of measuring inequality has been employed by several authors, see,
e.g., Brush (2007).
22 As mean household income is not available from the Census Bureau's data ﬁles, fol-
lowing Brush (2007), we construct it by multiplying personal income per capita by av-
erage persons per household in the county.
23 The USA Counties dataset is available at http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml.methods both indicate that diversity is signiﬁcantly negatively related
to growth, whereas educational attainment and income inequality are
signiﬁcantly positively associated with growth. However, the sign of
the OLS estimates on state and local government employment share
and the land area per capita differ from their quantile counterpart.
While the OLS result indicates that lg is negatively associated with
growth, the quantile results show that lg is negatively associated
with growth only at the 0.05th and 0.5th quantiles. In contrast, lg is
positively associated with growth at the 0.95th quantile. Similarly,
ld is negatively related to growth in counties at the 0.05th and 0.5th
quantiles and around the mean of the conditional growth distribu-
tion, but is positively related to growth at the 0.95th quantile.
Most importantly, the coefﬁcient on sk is positive but insigniﬁcant
at the 0.05th quantile and signiﬁcantly negative at the conditional
mean and the 0.5th and 0.95th quantiles, implying that social capital
is uncorrelated with growth in slow-growing counties, but negatively
related to growth in median- and fast-growing counties. These het-
erogeneities highlight the potential pitfall of deriving policy implica-
tions exclusively from classical mean regressions.
We next examine whether the relationships between economic
growth and its determinants depend on the level of social capital.
The conventional way to introduce parameter heterogeneity into an
empirical model is to include interaction terms as additional controls.
Table 3 reports the results of this exercise.(1.10) (2.78)*** (2.03)** (3.06)***
lg −0.0003 −0.0006 −0.0001 0.0009
(2.46)** (8.62)*** (1.31) (10.38)***
ld −0.0086 −0.0582 −0.0130 0.0104
(1.98)** (72.00)*** (19.13)*** (13.37)***
Constant 0.0860 0.1155 0.0819 0.0840
(8.57)*** (8.74)*** (16.20)*** (6.92)***
R2or Pseudo R2 0.15 0.3202 0.0724 0.0548
Number of observations is 3059.
Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
24 The estimates from a parametric quantile regression model with interaction terms
are detailed in Table 3.
25 The exceptions are the parametric coefﬁcient estimates on hc and fg at the 0.05th
quantile, which lie entirely within the 90% conﬁdence bounds of the corresponding co-
efﬁcient estimate.
Table 3
OLS and parametric quantile regression results: speciﬁcation with interaction terms.
OLS Parametric quantile regression
τ=0.05 τ=0.5 τ=0.95
sk 0.0084 0.0285 0.0090 0.0082
(1.36) (3.16)*** (2.47)** (0.99)
lny1990 −0.0206 −0.0256 −0.0158 −0.0193
(8.06)*** (6.55)*** (10.95)*** (4.56)***
hc 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007
(8.96)*** (3.63)*** (11.97)*** (9.38)***
dv −0.0604 −0.0068 −0.0020 −0.0899
(1.80)* (0.18) (0.09) (1.31)
ie 0.0106 0.0104 0.0087 0.0042
(3.23)*** (1.86)* (4.03)*** (0.82)
fg −0.0005 0.0015 −0.0008 0.0001
(0.76) (4.45)*** (2.50)** (0.35)
lg −0.0002 −0.0009 −0.0002 0.0004
(1.35) (12.54)*** (3.47)*** (3.51)***
ld −0.0090 −0.0563 −0.0120 0.0099
(1.92)* (68.40)*** (19.28)*** (13.23)***
sk*lny1990 −0.0018 −0.0062 −0.0026 −0.0016
(1.38) (2.99)*** (3.12)*** (0.97)
sk*hc 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.73)* (1.52) (3.12)*** (1.70)*
sk*dv 0.0113 −0.0017 −0.0012 0.0170
(1.56) (0.21) (0.26) (1.15)
sk*ie −0.0013 0.0000 0.0021 −0.0040
(0.53) (0.01) (1.33) (1.10)
sk*fg −0.0009 −0.0011 −0.0005 −0.0027
(1.99)** (3.77)*** (1.49) (11.00)***
sk*lg −0.0001 0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0005
(0.87) (13.52)*** (2.87)*** (10.02)***
sk*ld 0.0008 −0.0008 0.0012 0.0059
(0.81) (1.39) (2.87)*** (12.90)***
Constant 0.0989 0.1154 0.0795 0.1077
(8.51)*** (7.19)*** (12.30)*** (5.61)***
R2or Pseudo R2 0.16 0.3271 0.0755 0.0742
Number of observations is 3059. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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teraction terms offer the following insights. First, the interaction
term between sk and ln y1990enters signiﬁcantly negatively at the
0.05th and 0.5th quantiles, indicating that social capital accelerates
income convergence only in low- and median-growth counties. Sec-
ond, the coefﬁcient on the interaction term between sk and hc is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant at the 0.5th and 0.95th quantiles, suggesting that
in median and high-growth counties one can boost the productivity
of human capital by promoting social capital formation. However,
policies aimed at making human capital more productive through in-
creasing social capital may be ineffective in slow-growing counties.
Third, the coefﬁcient on the interaction between sk and fg is signiﬁ-
cantly negative at the 0.05th and 0.95th quantiles, suggesting that
in low- and high-growth counties promoting social capital formation
worsens the growth impact of government employment at the feder-
al level. Fourth, the interaction term between sk and lg enters posi-
tively (negatively) and signiﬁcantly at the 0.05th (0.5th and 0.95th)
quantile, indicating that accumulating social capital can make state
and local governments more (less) growth-enhancing in low- (medi-
an and high-) growth counties. Fifth, the coefﬁcient on the interaction
term between sk and ld is signiﬁcantly positive at the 0.5th and 0.95th
quantiles. Therefore, promoting social networks and enhancing social
embeddedness in median and high-growth counties make declines in
population density less detrimental to growth.
In sum, the signs and magnitudes of the coefﬁcient estimates dif-
fer across the quantiles of economic growth rate. Thus, growth-
enhancing policies derived from mean regressions may not have the
desired effect in counties at the tails of the growth distribution. The
ﬁnding of parameter heterogeneity across points on the conditional
growth distribution illustrates potential information gains from the
estimation of the entire conditional distribution of growth as opposedto the conditional mean only. Moreover, there is evidence that the con-
vergence speed and marginal effects of human capital, government ac-
tivity, and population density on growth vary with the level of social
capital at a constant rate.5.2. Smooth coefﬁcient quantile regression results
As mentioned, the major limitation of the parametric model with
interaction terms is that the covariate effects are constrained to vary
with social capital at a constant rate. To allow the covariate effects
to vary with the level of social capital in a more ﬂexible way, we
apply the novel semiparametric smooth coefﬁcient quantile estima-
tion strategy developed by Cai and Xu (2009) to estimate growth
equations. The cross-validated optimal number of observations in-
cluded in the local linear k-nn estimation, which controls the amount
of local information used to construct the estimates, is kopt = 592 for
τ=0.05, 426 for τ=0.5, and 568 for τ=0.95.
To illustrate the extent of heterogeneity and to identify the level of
social capital index at which each covariate has the largest impact on
growth, we list in Table 4 the minimum and maximum statistically
signiﬁcant estimates of βjτ(sk), j=0, 1,…, 7 for the quantiles
τ=0.05,0.5, and 0.95 together with the corresponding level of social
capital index. The disparities between the minimum and maximum
of coefﬁcient estimates are large in magnitude, providing evidence
that cross-county differences in the social structure in which econom-
ic activities take place may lead to heterogeneities in the way lny1990,
hc, dv, ie, fg, lg, and ld affect growth. For example, at τ=0.5 the im-
plied convergence rate ranges from 0.7% (when sk equals 0.6047) to
9.17% (when sk equals 2.3079). At τ=0.05, when sk is equal to
−0.5681, an increase in the Gini index by 0.01 is associated with a
0.0116 percentage point decrease in the 0.05th percentile of econom-
ic growth rate. In contrast, when sk is equal to−3.5327, the same in-
crease in the Gini index is associated with a 0.117 percentage point
increase in the 0.05th percentile of growth.
It can also be seen from Table 4 that the covariate effects can vary
substantially depending on the county's position on the growth dis-
tribution. For instance, the last column in Table 4 shows that for the
county at the 0.05th growth quantile with a social capital index of
−3.5327, an increase in land area per capita by 0.01 square miles is
associated with an increase in growth of 0.062 percentage point. In
contrast, in a county with the same amount of sk but is located at
the 95th quantile, the same increase in ld is associated with a
0.0631 percentage point fall in growth.
The complete picture of parameter heterogeneity can be visualized
using a three dimensional plot. As an illustration, Fig. 1 plots the estimated
coefﬁcient of land area per capita against the social capital index and
quantiles (τ=0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9) on two horizontal axes. One can ob-
serve from Fig. 1 that for all values of τ, the coefﬁcient estimate on ld is
highly nonlinear over sk and that different percentiles of growth exhibit
different patterns of social capital–economic growth nexus.
Figs. 2 through 9 respectively plot the estimated coefﬁcient functions
βτj skð Þ; j ¼ 0;1;…;7(red solid line) and their 90% pointwise conﬁdence
intervals (dashed lines) against sk for three quantiles τ=0.05,0.5, and
0.95. To contrast our results with those obtained using conventional
methods, we also plot the marginal effects obtained from the parametric
quantile model with interaction terms (blue solid line).24
As seen from these diagrams, in most cases the coefﬁcient esti-
mates from the parametric model with interaction terms are outside
the 90% conﬁdence bounds of the smooth coefﬁcient model over a
wide range of the level of sk.25 Since the SCQR model nests the
Table 4
Minimum and maximum of signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates and convergence speed.
Convergence speed intercept hc dv fg lg ie ld
τ=0.05 Max 0.0649 0.1759 0.0011 −0.0328 0.0084 NA 0.1177 0.0620
[−3.5327] [1.5639] [2.1675] [3.963] [−3.062] [−3.5327] [−3.5327]
Min 0.0098 0.0328 0.0002 −0.0376 −0.0247 NA −0.0116 −0.0850
[−0.0158] [−0.0151] [−0.8437] [1.8616] [0.6440] [−0.5681] [0.3016]
τ=0.5 Max 0.0917 0.2809 0.0012 −0.0039 −0.0080 0.0040 0.0255 −0.0043
[2.3079] [2.3079] [2.4364] [−0.9213] [2.8052] [0.1425] [1.7704] [−1.1321]
Min 0.007 0.0327 0.0001 −0.0198 −0.0310 −0.0017 −0.0502 −0.0464
[0.6047] [0.0952] [−1.8510] [−2.9226] [−3.5327] [−0.7154] [3.3339] [−3.5327]
τ=0.95 Max 0.0483 0.1936 0.0039 −0.0032 0.0204 NA 0.0294 0.0239
[2.2318] [2.2038] [−3.5327] [−0.1417] [−2.3865] [0.0528] [0.3627]
Min 0.0072 0.0384 0.0002 −0.0479 −0.0480 NA −0.0353 −0.0631
[−0.1407] [−0.2928] [−0.2523] [3.9416] [−3.5327] [3.5905] [−3.5327]
The maximums and minimums are based on estimates that are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The levels of social capital at which the maximum/minimum occur are in the square brackets.
NA indicates that the coefﬁcient is statistically insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent level at all values of social capital.
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with interaction terms is misspeciﬁed and restricting the covariate ef-
fects to change with sk at a constant rate is likely to generate mislead-
ing results. Moreover, for most covariates the proﬁle shape of the
estimated coefﬁcient function over the level of social capital differs
substantially across the three quantiles, demonstrating that the con-
ditioning variable role of social capital differs widely across fast-
and slow-growing economies. This behavior is difﬁcult to model
using a parametric speciﬁcation in a mean regression setting.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the results in Figs. 2–9.
Fig. 2 shows that the smooth intercept varies with sk in a highly non-
linear fashion. Recall that the pattern of the intercept term signiﬁes
the direct information variable role of social capital. Irrespective of
the quantile, the intercept from the benchmark parametric model is
outside the 90% conﬁdence bands of the SCQR model for a large
share of sk, suggesting that ceteris paribus, social capital affects
growth directly but nonlinearly.
Fig. 3 shows that for all three quantiles, the coefﬁcient on initial
income is statistically signiﬁcantly negative over most of the range
of sk, supporting the hypothesis of conditional convergence. The sta-
tistically signiﬁcant estimates on lny1990 imply that for slow-growing
counties, convergence rate is highest when social capital is scarce,
whereas for counties at the median of the growth distribution, con-
vergence rate is highest when social capital is highly developed.
Therefore, accelerating convergence through cultivating social capital
is effective (counterproductive) in counties with median (low) eco-
nomic growth rate.
We now turn to the coefﬁcient estimate on educational attain-
ment in Fig. 4. For all three quantiles considered, educational attain-
ment is statistically signiﬁcantly positively associated with growth
over most of the range of sk, suggesting that human capital is good
for growth. Note that at τ=0.05(0.5 and 0.95), the coefﬁcient from
the parametric model with interaction terms is inside (outside) the
90% conﬁdence bounds for most values of sk, indicating that the
growth effect of human capital increases linearly (nonlinearly) with
the level of social capital. For low-growth counties, educational at-
tainment exerts a more pronounced impact on growth when sk is
higher. For median-growth counties, the growth impact of education-
al attainment is most pronounced when sk is either very low or very
high. In contrast, for high-growth counties human capital is most
growth-enhancing at low levels of sk. These results together imply
that boosting the productivity of human capital through social capital
formation is viable only in low- and median-growth counties.
Fig. 5 plots the estimated coefﬁcient function for ethnic diversity.
For all three quantiles considered and over most of the range of sk,
the coefﬁcient on dv is statistically signiﬁcantly negative. This sug-
gests that diversity is generally bad for growth. The coefﬁcient esti-
mate varies widely across the quantiles and does not exhibit anysort of monotonicity over sk. It is noteworthy that at the 0.05th quan-
tile, the coefﬁcient on diversity turns signiﬁcantly positive at high
values of sk, suggesting that diversity can actually be turned into an
advantage in slow-growing counties by maintaining a high level of
social capital. However, doing so is likely to aggravate the adverse ef-
fect of diversity on growth in fast-growing counties.
One can observe from Fig. 6 that for all quantiles, the coefﬁcient
estimate on inequality is signiﬁcantly negative at high values of sk, in-
dicating that inequality is more detrimental to growth where social
capital is more developed. This ﬁnding is important, as it constitutes
evidence that social networks may act as special interest groups
that channel resources towards the rich.
Fig. 7 graphs the estimated coefﬁcient function of federal govern-
ment size. Irrespective of the quantile, the coefﬁcient on fg is insignif-
icantly different from zero over most of the range of sk. However, at
τ=0.05, fg has statistically signiﬁcantly positive effects on growth
when social capital is scarce. On the other hand, at τ=0.5 and 0.95,
the coefﬁcient function on fg follows an inverted U shape with the co-
efﬁcient estimates on fg negative and signiﬁcant at very low and very
high values of sk. The implication of these results is that, while federal
government activities are positively correlated with growth in slow-
growing counties with little social capital, they are particularly bad
for growth in median- and high-growth counties that have very
high or very low levels of social capital.
Fig. 8 illustrates that regardless of the quantile, the coefﬁcient on
state and local government size is insigniﬁcant and small in magni-
tude over most of the range of sk. This leads us to conclude that the
growth effect of state and local government activity is largely insignif-
icant and modest.
Fig. 9 illustrates interesting differences across the conditional
growth quantiles in the proﬁle shapes of the coefﬁcient estimates
on land area per capita over the range of the social capital index. At
τ=0.05, the coefﬁcient function on ld is signiﬁcantly positive (nega-
tive) at low (medium and high) values of sk, indicating that
population density exerts a negative (positive) impact on growth in
slow-growing counties with little (much) social capital. It is therefore
possible to make population density more growth-enhancing by
building social capital in slow-growing counties that are short of so-
cial capital. At τ=0.5, the coefﬁcient estimate on ld is signiﬁcantly
negative throughout the range of sk, indicating that population densi-
ty is good for growth in median-growth counties and is particularly so
when social capital is scarce. At τ=0.95, the coefﬁcient function of ld
is largely an increasing function of sk. While the coefﬁcient estimate
on ld is signiﬁcantly negative at low values of sk, it turns signiﬁcantly
positive at high values of sk. These results imply that population
density is good (bad) for growth at high-growth counties that are
short of (abundant in) social capital. Thus, nurturing social capital
in median- and high-growth counties with little social capital will
Fig. 1. Estimated coefﬁcient on land area per capita at various quantiles and levels of social capital.
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growth-impeding.
Finally, to compare the goodness of ﬁt of our semiparametric SCQR
model and that of the parametric quantile regression model with in-
teraction terms, we plot in Fig. 10 the R(τ) (pseudo R2) for both
models against τ.26 Two implications can be drawn from Fig. 10.
First and most importantly, irrespective of the percentile, the pseudo
R2 for the SCQR model is always about 0.1 higher than that for the
parametric model, conﬁrming that the SCQR model ﬁts the data bet-
ter. Second, both models ﬁt the data better at lower tails. For both
models the pseudo R2 is highest at τ=0.05. At τ=0.05, the covariates
in the smooth coefﬁcient (parametric) model explains 43.88%
(32.87%) of the variation in the 0.05th percentile of economic growth.
The goodness of ﬁt for the SCQR model (parametric model with inter-
action term) deteriorates monotonically as τ increases and reaches its26 Formula (7) is a measure of the goodness of ﬁt for a given τ. Hao and Naiman
(2007) suggest that the assessment of the goodness of ﬁt of a smooth coefﬁcient quan-
tile regression model for the whole distribution requires examining R(τ) collectively.
Following their suggestion, we calculate R(τ) for τ=0.05, 0.1, 0.2,…, 0.9, 0.95.minimum of 0.1053 (0.0461) at τ=0.7 (0.9). These results imply that
the covariates explain a greater proportion of observed economic
growth in slow-growing counties than in median- and fast-growing
counties.
6. Conclusions
In contrast to earlier empirical literature on multiple growth re-
gimes which focused on heterogeneity over income level, this study
delves deeper into the source of heterogeneous growth by focusing
on the role of a more meaningful variable – social capital – in gener-
ating parameter heterogeneity. Based on a cross-sectional county-
level data set from the U.S., this analysis addresses modeling issues
that may have limited the scope of heterogeneity found in earlier re-
search, such as the sorting of countries into groups, the restriction
that requires a single growth regime applies to all countries in the
same grouping, the ex ante restrictions on the functional forms, and
the failure to provide evidence on differences in the interactions be-
tween social capital and growth determinants across quantiles of
the growth distribution.
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geneity in the growth process, we estimate cross-county growth equa-
tions using Cai and Xu's (2009) smooth coefﬁcient quantile regression
method. This modeling approach permits both the direct effect of social
capital on growth and the marginal effects of conventional growth de-
terminants on growth to vary nonlinearly with the level of social capital
and allows the pattern of this variation to differ across the quantiles of
the growth distribution. The pseudo R2s conﬁrm that the goodness of
ﬁt of the SCQR model is higher than that of the benchmark parametric
model at all quantiles of the growth distribution.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the percentiles of growth
exhibit substantially different proﬁle shapes of the estimated coefﬁ-
cient functions. Second, there is evidence of strong heterogeneity in
the marginal effects of initial income, human capital, income inequal-
ity, ethnic diversity, government activity, and population density on
the percentiles of growth over the level of social capital. Third, since
the SCQR model permits nonlinear interactions between the covariates
and social capital, it is found to ﬁt the data better than a benchmark
parametric model.
Our results imply that cross-sectional variations in economic per-
formances stem from not only differences in the values of growth de-
terminants, but also differences in the impacts these variables
generate, which in turn depend on the economy's level of social cap-
ital and position on the growth distribution. The highly nonlinear and
in many cases non-monotonic coefﬁcient function estimates indicatePs
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and the parametric quantile regression model with interaction term.that the role of social capital in determining the growth regime is
complex. As such, parametric mean regression models that ignore
heterogeneity and nonlinearity in the growth process may yield mis-
leading conclusions for a wide range of counties.
More research is needed to understand the interaction between
social capital and growth determinants more completely. A given
type of social capital that is growth-enhancing in some cases may
hamper growth in others. An interesting extension to our work is to
re-estimate growth regressions using measures of different dimen-
sions of social capital as a state variable, such as voter turnout, degree
of social trust, and densities of various types of social networks.
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